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Tennyson and Sarty: Sydney and the U-Boat War

Brian Tennyson and Roger Sarty

D

uring the summer of 1918. when German
submarines thrust into North American
coastal waters, Sydney. Nova Scotia suddenly
became a major naval base and Canada's
foremost convoy assembly harbour. 1 Nearly a
hundred of the Royal Canadian Navy's coastal
patrol vessels came to the Cape Breton port, with
at least 1,500 crewmen and shore personnel, 2
but this was not enough. Britain was unable to
help. Therefore the United States Navy pitched
in for what was the first instance of joint
operations by the armed forces of the two North
American nations. Some 350 American sailors
came to establish base facilities and operate
patrol vessels and aircraft assigned to Sydney.
Thousands more passed through on ships
assembling for convoy. J u s t as the naval
authorities at Sydney had to cope with rapidly
changing and increasing operational demands,
so too the citizens had to deal with a veritable
naval invasion of their town.
Sydney, for most of the First World War, was
a small outstation of Halifax. That began to
change in 1917 when the success of German
submarine attacks on merchant shipping in the
eastern Atlantic forced the British Admiralty to
sail cargo vessels from North America in
defended convoys. Britain depended upon this
North American trade for fully 50 per cent of its
imports. Sydney, with its large harbour,
abundant coal supplies, and strategic location
on both the St. Lawrence route and the Great
Circle route to Europe, became the assembly
port for slow-speed shipping from Canadian and
US ports. As many as 50 to 60 vessels appeared
for each convoy, which sailed at eight-day
intervals. 3

In 1917 the danger of submarine attack
remained in the eastern Atlantic but that changed
in 1918. During the winter the British Admiralty
warned that new types of large, long-range
submarines would almost certainly begin to
strike in Canadian and US waters beginning in
the coming spring. The Admiralty, however, had
to renege on its long-standing promise to send
destroyers, the best type of anti-submarine and
convoy escort ship, to help deal with the threat.
Small coastal patrol craft were being built in
Canada for the Royal Navy, and the British
arranged to turn 66 of these over to the Canadian
service. The better of these craft were 30 steel
trawlers of about 350 tons displacement that
carried a light gun and a few depth charges, and
could make a best speed of 10 knots. They were,
in other words, scarcely a third of the size of a
destroyer with considerably less than half the
speed and a tiny fraction of the armament. The
36 wooden drifters were smaller still, and had a
speed of no more t h a n 9 k n o t s in ideal
c o n d i t i o n s . Moreover, C a n a d a , h a v i n g
concentrated on raising land forces for the
Western F r o n t a n d c u r t a i l e d its n a v a l
development to about two dozen converted
civilian steamers on British advice, would at this
late stage in the war be very hard-pressed to find
qualified seamen for the 66 craft.4
Not surprisingly, Vice-Admiral William
Lowther Grant, the British Commander-in-Chief,
North America and West Indies and the senior
officer responsible for the convoy system in the
western Atlantic, was worried. With no help
forthcoming from Britain, Grant looked south
to the newest member of the Allied coalition. He
set up a meeting in Washington between senior
Canadian and US Navy officers on 20 April to
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see what could be done. The Americans offered
six submarine chasers, 110-foot long wooden
craft that were somewhat better armed than most
of the Canadian vessels, with a much better
speed of 16 knots. They also promised to send
naval air patrol units to Halifax and Sydney, but
this more ambitious scheme would take some
time to arrange. 5 The US Navy s u b m a r i n e
chasers arrived at Halifax on 16 May 1918.
Feeble as these craft were c o m p a r e d to
destroyers, they were the most capable warships
available and immediately took up the task of
long-range convoy escort. There was much of this
work to do in Halifax in the spring of 1918.
During the winter freeze-up of the St. Lawrence,
the slow convoys, designated "HS," moved from
Sydney to Halifax. The latter port was also the
year-round assembly point for smaller "HC"
convoys of more valuable "medium speed" ships,
including troop t r a n s p o r t s . The American
chasers were organized into two divisions of
three vessels each, one being responsible for the
slow convoy, and the other for the medium speed
convoy. The chasers stayed with the convoys for
the first twenty-four hours of passage, a distance
of 150 to 200 miles. Submarines could most
readily lie in wait and make contact with convoys
in this critical coastal waters zone, where the
ships were most vulnerable as they slowly picked
up speed and m a n o e u v r e d into cruising
formation. The slower Canadian patrol vessels
kept a watch at the harbour mouth before and
during the departure of the merchantmen, and
then did their best to keep up a screen around
them for a few hours as they picked up speed. 6
Meanwhile, during the spring of 1918 work
was urgently underway at Sydney to prepare for
the vastly increased operations planned for the
summer. Buildings were rented or constructed
on the waterfront to serve as workshops,
storehouses and barracks. The first patrol
vessels arrived as soon as they were able to push
their way through the ice in late May, and
increasing numbers came in the following six
weeks. Two-thirds of the new trawlers and
drifters were assigned to Sydney, together with
the bulk of the most capable armed yachts and
civilian steamers that had carried out coastal
patrols since earlier in the war. Among the latter
were the fisheries patrol vessel Canada, the
customs vessel Margaret, the post office steamer
Lady Evelyn, the former American seagoing
yachts Stadacona and Hochelaga, and the

hydrographie survey ships Acadia and Cartier.
None of these "auxiliary patrol ships" was as fast
as the US chasers, but they were bigger and more
seaworthy. They were therefore assigned,
together with some of the new trawlers, to a
"Mobile Patrol Flotilla," which had the job of
filling in for destroyers in the offensive hunting
role. The Patrol flotilla was organized into
divisions that each included one or two of the
larger ships and a pair of trawlers. The task of
these divisions was to roam the Gulf of St.
Lawrence and waters south of Newfoundland
ready to respond to any reports of submarines,
or to assist the convoys funnelling out of Halifax
and Sydney. The rest of the trawlers and drifters
at Sydney were assigned to a "Forming Up Escort
and Outer Patrol Flotilla" to screen the HS
convoys as they emerged from port and formed
up in the Cabot Strait. 7
The Patrol and Forming Up flotillas began to
function in early July, when HS 47, the first
convoy of the 1918 season to assemble at Sydney,
departed. One division of American submarine
chasers, SC 51, SC 183 and SC 241, moved for
the season from Halifax to Sydney just in time
to provide the long-range escort for this convoy.8
In theory this all seemed efficient. The reality
was otherwise. One bright spot was the
dependability of the US chasers, which were
almost unfailingly ready for service and on
station when and where they were required. This
said a great deal about the ability of the US Navy
to produce ships and trained personnel in a
hurry. Canada, by contrast, had barely a shadow
organization. 9 Many of the new craft, which
formed the bulk of the Sydney fleet, were only
completed in the preceding winter and spring,
by builders with limited experience, in the midst
of the extreme chills and sudden thaws of the
St. Lawrence River region that caused hull
structures to shrink and expand, opening many
leaks. Armament was slow to arrive from Britain,
and was still being fitted in many of the vessels
as late as August. The only two m a r i n e
engineering firms of any size, Sydney Foundry
and North Sydney Marine Railway, were unequal
to the heavy demands thrust upon them, so
Sydney-based ships disappeared for days or
weeks to yards around the Maritimes or, quite
often, struggled out to sea without essential work
having been done. 10 The crews were a mixture
of older civilian seamen, with little or no naval
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HMCS Lansdowne, the name given to the rented waterfront facilities that served as the RCN patrol base at
Sydney, NS in the 1918 season. Among the vessels at the wharf are the drifter CD 73, one of the New
England trawler-minesweepers (called 'PVs in RCN service), and the Admiralty trawler TR 3 3 .
(Maritime Command Museum)

experience, and teenagers with even less.
Qualified personnel were so thinly spread that
they not infrequently jumped from one vessel as
it came into port onto another about to sail.
In early August this shaky organization came
under extreme pressure. No one expected early
trouble. British naval intelligence, which had
broken German naval radio codes, knew that
the submarine U-156, which had arrived in US
waters in mid-July, had orders to remain mere. 11
What such excellent intelligence could not foresee
was an aggressive commander going beyond his
orders. That is what happened at the beginning
of August. After causing a furore with attacks on
shipping in the Gulf of Maine, U 156 easily
eluded the US Navy hunting group that was in
pursuit, and suddenly appeared off Halifax on
the morning of 5 August, sinking a tanker within
30 miles of the harbour mouth. The Halifax
flotilla, which was further out to sea protecting
an HC convoy of troopships, could not reach the
scene in time. Although everyone breathed a sigh
of relief that the transports, carrying 12,000
Canadian and American soldiers, had escaped
attack, it was clear that the anti-submarine
warships available could not secure the Halifax
approaches. 12

Within hours of the attack on the tanker,
Admiral Grant ordered all merchant shipping
bound for Halifax to make for Sydney, clear of
U-l56's hunting area. Prior to the appearance
of the s u b m a r i n e , medium speed vessels
allocated to carry American troops and supplies
had loaded at New York, and then gone to Halifax
to join up into HC convoys with vessels carrying
Canadian troops and cargoes that had loaded at
Montreal and Halifax. Henceforth, the Montreal
and Halifax ships were to assemble at Sydney
and sail so as to rendezvous with the New York
ships on the Grand Banks east of Newfoundland,
clear of the coastal danger area. This was an
operation that required precision and intimate
cooperation between shipping and convoy
authorities in Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax, New
York, Washington, and, of course, Sydney, which
bore the ultimate responsibility for getting the
Montreal and Halifax ships to sea in good time
while also maintaining the large HS convoy
series. 13
Captain Walter Hose, an experienced British
naval officer who had transferred to the Canadian
service and commanded all the flotillas based at
Sydney, now had to rejig the organization he was
still laboriously putting into place. He reassigned
31
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the American submarine chaser division, his
fastest group, to the long-range escort of the HC
convoys and gave responsibility for the HS series
to the auxiliary patrol ships and trawlers of the
Mobile Patrol Flotilla.14
The Sydney section of HC 13 — four
m e r c h a n t vessels and the British armed
merchant cruiser HMS Victorian — sailed on 14
August, only two days later than the usual eightday cycle, and duly met the New York group on
the Grand Banks on the 16th. 15 The whole
performance was an impressive demonstration
of the efficiency of the shipping control
organization after a year's experience with
convoy.
The sailing of two ocean convoys every eight
days was only p a r t of the increased and
unexpected commitments for Sydney in the
summer of 1918. Most important among the
other new tasks was the escort of groups of highvalue merchant ships between Halifax and
Sydney, Sydney into the Gulf of St. Lawrence,
and between Sydney and Newfoundland ports.
The system was not formally organized as it
would be in the Second World War, but it was
comprehensive and, as in the later war, Sydney
served as the central hub. Oddly, there is virtually
no mention of the coastal convoy system in the
policy and operations files but the surviving
s h i p s ' logs a n d r e p o r t s of p r o c e e d i n g s ,
fragmentary as they are, leave no doubt that local
escort was a major commitment. The available,
sketchy information shows that 13 trawlers and
auxiliary patrol vessels carried out 15 local
escort missions during the last three weeks of
August alone. There is some evidence that the
ferry that ran between North Sydney and Portaux-Basques, Newfoundland, was regularly
escorted and conclusive evidence that the St.
John's run had a top priority equal to that from
Halifax, with groups of two and three escorts
being assembled for each voyage. Among the
ships shepherded from Sydney to St. John's and
back were the vessels that supplied the Sydney
and Sydney Mines steel mills with ore from the
mines at Wabana in Conception Bay, near St.
John's. 16
U-l56 had gone back to US waters after the
attack off Halifax on 5 August, but then returned
to Nova Scotia waters and announced the fact
with panache. On 21 August the crew of the

fishing trawler Triumph came ashore in boats
at Canso, Nova Scotia, with an amazing story.
The day before, some 60 miles offshore, the
Germans had seized the trawler, run up their
ensign, and used the Canadian vessel to attack
other fishing craft. Soon scores of fishermen were
streaming ashore. This apparently bold action
was in fact a desperate one. The tiny fishing
vessels were barely worth the time and effort
required to sink them, but U-l56 could not pick
up any trace of the big ships that were its priority
target; all of these had been grouped into the
new coastal convoy system and the main
transoceanic convoys. On 20 August the 43
merchantmen of HS 52 had sailed from Sydney
under the long-range escort of Canadian navy
trawlers, and the next day the Canadian section
of HC 14 had put out from Sydney under the
protection of the US submarine chasers. 17 Thus
there was no regular traffic of unprotected major
steamers that the submarine had banked on
finding, just empty seas.
The allied navies had long anticipated raids
on the fishing fleets, but concluded that little
could be done. Hundreds of vessels fished in a
thousand mile arc from the Gulf of Maine to the
Great Bank east of Newfoundland, all following
their noses to the best catch. Almost none of the
fishing craft carried radios, meaning word of
attacks, as in the case of those off Canso and
eastern Cape Breton, did not get out until the
fishermen had rowed ashore long after the
event.18
Nevertheless, when word reached Sydney on
21 August of the attacks off Canso, wide ranging
patrols of the fishing banks immediately became
a major new commitment. As the US chasers
and Canadian ships returned from escort duty
they hurriedly put to sea again. 19 One of these
missions, by a division of the Mobile Patrol
Flotilla, caught sight of U-l56 in the vicinity of
the i s l a n d of St. Pierre on 25 A u g u s t .
Unfortunately, the lead vessel, HMCS Hochelaga,
turned away to get support from the other vessels
of the division some miles away; by the time the
warships returned the U-boat was long gone.
Hose was aghast at this evidence of poor training
and spirit; Hochelaga's commanding officer was
court-martialled and dismissed from the service.
Privately, senior officers admitted that the tiny
patrol vessels would have little chance if one of
the big submarines fought back, but that was
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no excuse for Hochelaga, which could have
shaken the morale of the U-boat's crew and
possibly even inflicted some damage. 20
More importantly, two ocean convoys, HS 53
and HC 15, got safely away from Sydney on 2829 August. Evidence now available shows that

Scotia" to show no lights after dark. In fact,
according to Captain Frederick Pasco, the retired
Royal Navy officer who had come out for service
in Canada to command the shore establishments
and convoy staff at Sydney, these regulations had
been in effect for two years but had not been
enforced in Sydney because "they would be

SC 242 - One of the six 110-foot wooden American submarine chasers that operated under RCN control in
May-November 1918. SC 242 was part of the division that ran fast escort missions from Sydney. In addition
to a stern depth charge chute, she carried a "Y" gun, which can be clearly seen on the quarter deck, to fire
charges off both beams. Forward is a 6-pounder quick-firing gun.
(Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence Negative CN 3280)

their tracks passed within about 100 miles of
the routes U-156 and a second submarine U117 (which kept well out to sea) . Had the 26
ships in the two convoys sailed independently
on varying courses at intervals as each became
ready for sea, the two submarines would have
had a good chance of locating and sinking several
of them. 21
With the naval war being fought so close to
Sydney, it is not surprising that steps were taken
to tighten up security in the coastal communities.
B l a c k o u t r e g u l a t i o n s were i m p o s e d in
September, requiring "all seaport towns in Nova

obviously ineffective here because of the Steel
Company whose lights are blazing all the night
and as they could not be extinguished it would
serve no good purpose to darken the city."22 As
one sea captain asked, "what would be the use
of darkened lights in houses and on automobiles
in this city when the glare from the steel plant,
when slag is being poured, can be observed up
to thirty five miles at sea?" 23 At the same time,
the detailed published reports on the U-boats'
activities gathered by newspapermen who
swarmed around seamen from the sunken ships
caused mounting concern in naval circles.
Accordingly, on 3 September the chief press
33
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censor at Ottawa notified the telephone
companies that "the transmission of information
by telephone regarding the movements of
submarines off the coast, or efforts taken by the
authorities to restrict these activities, is
forbidden."24
The arrival of the naval war on Cape Breton's
doorstep had its greatest impact on life in Sydney
with the influx into town of hundreds of seamen
on leave. Many of Sydney's citizens joined in
u n d e r t a k i n g s by local service clubs and
benevolent organizations to provide badly
needed social services to the servicemen and
merchant sailors passing through the
community. The Navy League, for example,
opened tea rooms in the old St. George's rectory
on the Esplanade, in July 1918. There the
members of the Louisbourg and Yendys chapters
of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the
Empire (IODE), assisted by large numbers of
volunteers from the city, catered to anyone who
n e e d e d a hot meal a n d comfortable
surroundings. 25 The doors of the tea rooms were
always open and, in addition to a dining area,
there were three rooms with newspapers, writing
tables and a piano. On cool days fires burned in
the grates. "These fires are very cheery and
comforting and at times convenient for other
purposes than keeping people warm (for instance
when electric toasters go awry in the regions of
the kitchen and six people are waiting for toast
and tea and seven more for poached eggs on
toast.)"26
Many servicemen and merchant sailors spent
their time at Sydney not on leave but in the local
civilian and special military hospitals recovering
from wounds or illness. Moxham's castle — a
somewhat grandiose romantic mansion built by
a former general manager of the Sydney steel
plant — had been converted into a temporary
war hospital, as had the less dramatic but
substantial Ross mansion. Because the Moxham
hospital was some distance outside the city, the
local authorities organized a regular bus service
so that staff and convalescing patients could
come into town for business or entertainment.
Mary Isobel MacNeil, who worked at the Moxham
hospital towards the end of the war, recalled that
the men nevertheless "always managed to be
home for meals prepared for them by a good
cook." She referred particularly to a Mrs.

Lindsay, for whom the soldiers composed a song
entitled "Don't bite the hand that feeds you."27
On 11 September "that busy organization."
the B u s i n e s s Girls' Club, organized an
entertainment "for all the soldier and sailor
patients of the Ross and Moxham hospitals."
Enlisting the help of "nearly every automobile
owner in the city," the women took the staff and
patients for a drive "through the scenic sections
of the district." There were 18 cars in all and
the tour lasted an hour and a half. When they
arrived back at the Moxham hospital, a special
dinner had been prepared, followed by dancing,
pool and billiards. "From the third floor, where
the "mumps" moaned at his captivity, to the lower
floor where the "wall-flower" mentally wailed his
incapacity, interest was taken in the merry
waltzing and soft syncopating." The dancing
began with a set of lancers and "Piper Norman
Ross was the man of the hour with his pipes
and Sergt-Major ER Grant with his calling."28 The
success of this event encouraged more of the
same. 29 Here probably lies the origins of the
much more ambitious programme by service
clubs in Sydney during the Second World War to
provide highly popular excursions in the most
beautiful and restful parts of the countryside for
visiting seamen.
It may be a tribute to the generally welcoming
spirit of the citizens that there was only one
major disturbance in which servicemen were the
main instigators, and this was pretty clearly the
result of high-handedness on the part of a couple
of policemen. On the evening of Friday, 30
August, a police officer attempted to quiet down
some rowdy sailors. One witness reported that
"the officer knocked [a] sailor down preparatory
to putting the cuffs on him and then the trouble
started." Additional policemen arrived and
dispersed the seamen. No arrests were made but,
according to the press, "some of the sailors were
reported to have said that they intend[ed]
"cleaning up"" the following night. 30 Saturday
evening, a crowd of Canadian and American
sailors did indeed gather downtown. Some
carried "improvised c l u b s a n d o t h e r
weapons...concealed in their clothes." When the
police were unable to disperse the crowd, they
arrested an American sailor and took him off to
the jail. The crowd followed and the police felt
compelled to draw their guns to keep it at bay.
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U-156, the most aggressive of the German submarines to operate on the coast of Canada and the United
States in the summer of 1918.
During its seven-week mission in the Western Atlantic, U-156 laid mines
that sank the cruiser USS S a n Diego, destroyed a tanker with torpedoes and gunfire close off Halifax, and
captured the Canadian trawler T r i u m p h which, with a crew from the submarine, destroyed several schooners
off Canso and Cape Breton. U-156 itself was destroyed on its return voyage, probably in a minefield in the
North Sea.
(Horst Bredow U-Boot-Rchiv, Sylt, 69-44)
Sticks, bottles and stones flew in all directions
and a billiard ball thrown from the window of
the YMCA went through CP Moore's shop window
on the opposite side of the street. Women,
children and civilians followed every move of the
crowd and commented, some more emphatically
than elegantly, on the different turns of the affair.

A few arrests were made and leave for all
American, British and Canadian sailors was
cancelled on Sunday. The police chief, JB
McCormack, after meeting with naval officers,
gave assurances that "there will be little if any
trouble of this kind [again]."31
Captain Pasco, the commander of the port,
set up a committee that included representatives
of the naval ships in port to investigate the
incident. According to Ensign L.B. Sands, the
US Convoy Officer at Sydney, the American
sailors "strongly claimed ...that the arrests were
largely unjustified," and he accused the Sydney
police of "extreme violence...in dealing with our
men. All US men who have been arrested are
variously bruised and cut, and all claim that this
was done at the hands of the police either before
actual arrest or during the process of the same."
He further reported that several American
officers, including Lieutenant Commander Walter
May, the commanding officer of the USS Lake
Eckhart, one of the US Navy vessels in port,
spoke to McCormack "but were unable to get

much satisfaction as to the reason for the start
of the trouble or the manner in which the men
were treated after arrest." 32
Naval authorities were anxious that the clash
in the streets should not damage relations either
among the services or between the services and
the community. When the case went to court a
few days later, it was agreed that the payment of
damages resulting from the riot and an apology
by the American sailors who had caused it would
officially end the affair. "War conditions are given
as the cause of the decision." Of the Canadian
sailors charged, one was fined $5.75 for his part
in the trouble, "having cleared himself of the most
serious charges." Two others were charged with
breaking and entering Travis' music store. "They
are alleged to have broken the window of the
store and to have stolen a mandolin. The musical
instrument was in the hands of one of the men
when arrested." Other Canadian sailors faced
several charges, including participating in a riot
and carrying concealed weapons. 33 The crews of
the two American warships, Lake Eckhart and
Lake Benbow, were assessed $280 for property
damage, which consisted largely of broken plate
glass windows.
As the four men arrested and held in detention
by the police were also under various charges in
addition to the rioting, such as carrying concealed
weapons, burglary, and assault upon an officer,
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it was decided that this was the best settlement
possible, in that should the men have been
further tried and found guilty, outside the
damage, heavy fines would have been imposed,
and perhaps a jail sentence in addition, to say
nothing of their absences from their ships, which
are already undermanned. 3 4

The American naval officers were so outraged
at the behaviour of the police, however, that they
continued to urge an investigation of the force.
Sands, recognizing that "sentiment is more or
less against the Navy," advised against it, an
opinion that Pasco shared. McCormack gave
assurances that the two police officers about
whom the Americans were complaining would
be disciplined "and that all of his men will be
specially ordered to use no harsh or unnecessary
m e a s u r e s on any of our m e n who may
subsequently be taken under arrest. He is ready
to personally guarantee this and be responsible
for the treatment our men receive from now on."35
The US Navy subsequently restricted shore
leaves in Sydney "to only a limited number of
men at a time, and no liberty [was] to extend
beyond twelve o'clock, and patrols must be sent
ashore to assist in handling our men." This
applied to the crews of the submarine chasers
as well as to the warships and naval transports
putting into port for convoy.36
If the violence in the streets damaged
relations between the town and the armed forces,
the effects were soon mended u n d e r sad
circumstances in which the citizens rendered
generous service. The S p a n i s h influenza
epidemic which swept the western world, killing
an estimated twenty million people, arrived in
Sydney. On 22 September 500 infected American
sailors were brought ashore and, with the
hospitals overflowing, the Sydney Curling Club's
rink on George Street and five church halls were
put to use as temporary wards to accommodate
them. 37 By the 30th the hockey arena was being
cleaned and fitted up as well.38 On 4 October the
Post reported that there had been four fatalities
among the sailors but "these were men who were
practically beyond hope when they landed from
the ship." A United States Army medical officer
who came to help organize the effort39 spoke "in
the highest terms" of the treatment which the
American sailors received at Sydney "and of the
consideration shown by the regular staff of
doctors and nurses' at the Moxham hospital.

"Everything was done," he said, "that could
possibly have been done for their comfort and
convenience." Indeed, he thought it "a big thing
that we should have allowed these sick men to
land in Sydney and be cared for in the hospitals
at much inconvenience and some danger to the
people."
He mentioned very particularly the kindness
received from the ladles of the town, the gracious
sympathy shown by the President of the Red
Cross Society a n d the practical help given
through the members, as well as from private
sources. Soup, custards, ice-cream and other
delicacies have been sent to the sick men In
abundance. They are without a grievance and all
unite in their praise of Sydney hospitality. 40

The influenza epidemic spread to the general
population, though whether it had come from
the sailors or arrived by other means is unclear.
Within two weeks the schools, theatres and
churches in Sydney were closed. 41 Only at the
end of October did the number of new cases fall
off.42
Pervasive as the epidemic was at Sydney, it
did not hit any of the naval establishments and
warship divisions severely enough to interfere
with operations. These continued at full intensity.
The knowledge from radio intercepts that
another submarine, U-155, would be arriving
about mid-September with orders to operate
against the Halifax and St. John's traffic, and
that two additional submarines had been
assigned to North American waters allowed no
respite. Convoy escort duties, moreover, became
increasingly challenging.
The difficult high seas junction of separate
Sydney and New York sections of the HC convoys
had only been an interim measure. Intelligence
indications were that the U-boats would continue
to focus on the Halifax area, and moreover would
plant mines, a form of attack to which the port
was particularly vulnerable. The width of the
continental shelf off central Nova Scotia made
mining of the shipping routes possible 100 miles
and further out to sea. At Sydney, by contrast,
where the shelf falls quickly away into the deep
Cabot Strait trench, mining was not nearly so
grave a threat. The Admiralty had therefore
ordered medium-speed transports that had
previously loaded at Halifax and New York to go
to Montreal. They would then assemble for
convoy at Quebec City, and could sail north

36
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through the Strait of Belle Isle, completely clear
of the danger area off Nova Scotia and southern
Newfoundland. The Canadian navy protested
vehemently, knowing that the Gulf of St.
Lawrence, with its constricted routes, was one
area where convoy might not help ships evade
submarines, but rather lead them into traps at
the many choke points. What if another U-boat
commander, like that of U-156, disregarded his
orders and pushed into the gulf? The British
insisted, but released to the Canadian service
some additional drifters and trawlers building
for the Royal Navy in Canada so that permanent
patrols could be organized at the choke points
off Gaspe and in the Strait of Belle Isle. This
was yet another task that had to be organized
by Captain Hose's Sydney command. 43
Arrangements for HC 16, the first convoy to
assemble at Quebec, were a compromise. In
deference to the Americans, and for the last time,
a separate section sailed from New York. The
Admiralty had intended that the Quebec section
should nevertheless sail north of Newfoundland,
but agreed to the southern route through the
Cabot Strait because the new Strait of Belle Isle
patrol was not yet in place.44 The nine transports
and British cruiser HMS Cumberland of the
Quebec group of HC 16 sailed on 4 September.
Scrambling with only last minute notice because
of the many changes in plan, Hose managed to
have three of his auxiliary patrol ships meet the
convoy n o r t h of the M a g d a l e n e s on 6
September. 45 Meanwhile, the US submarine
chasers from Sydney waited at the western
entrance of the Cabot Strait to lend further
support, but never made contact; a building gale
severely battered the light wooden vessels and
they spent a harrowing night taking heavy seas
aboard, not daring to attempt to approach the
coast until the wild conditions subsided the next
day. 4 The New York and Quebec sections
successfully rendezvoused east of Newfoundland
on the 9th, but 32 hours late because of the
weather and the appearance of icebergs.47
Arrangements — and the weather — were
more settled for HC 17. This was the first convoy,
which included 15 merchant vessels and the
armed liner HMS Orvieto, entirely to assemble
at Quebec. It departed on 13 September and,
having had proper notice this time, Hose sent
his fastest auxiliary patrol ships, Lady Evelyn,
Margaret and Stadacona, in time to meet it on

the 14th off Gaspé. They carried on with the
convoy up through the Strait of Belle Isle, a
journey of nearly 400 miles, before turning back
for Sydney on the 16 th . 48
The smoothness with which this and the
following medium-speed convoys made the
challenging northern passage reflected well on
the crews of the merchant ships and their
Canadian escorts, but also the Canadian staffs
at Sydney, Halifax, Montreal and Quebec City
that had executed the direction of the senior
British command.49 The difficulty of the northern
passage may explain why, despite initial British
hopes the HS series would enter the gulf from
Sydney and also proceed out the Strait of Belle
Isle, these slow convoys continued to sail directly
out into the Atlantic south of Newfoundland.
These convoys were two to four times larger than
the HC series, and their creeping 7-knot speed
made the vessels less manoeuvrable than the 11
to 12 knot t r a n s p o r t s , a potentially fatal
disadvantage on the tricky northern route. 50 To
compensate for the danger of attack on the
southern route revealed by the decoded U-boat
signals, Hose reorganized his escort force yet
again to provide stronger protection. Freed from
responsibility for the HC transports, the US
submarine chasers now screened the HS series,
in combination with the slower auxiliary patrol
ships Cartier, Acadia, and Hochelaga, and two
or three trawlers. 51
With the auxiliary p a t r o l s h i p s now
committed to the ocean convoys, their previous
tasks of coastal escort and special patrols fell to
the trawlers. During September, with some
transfers from Halifax and the completion of
additional new construction, the strength of the
trawler force at Sydney increased to 29 vessels.52
The drifter force of the Sydney command had
meanwhile grown to 40, with others temporarily
attached to help with the multiplying demands
for s t a n d i n g p a t r o l s — at St. J o h n ' s ,
Newfoundland and the Canso Strait, in addition
to those in the gulf, and the original and still
priority commitment for coverage in the Cabot
Strait. Inadequate facilities to deal with "shake
down" problems of the new construction, and
heavy wear on the craft that had arrived early in
the season meant that breakdowns continued
to trouble the flotilla, not to mention fatigue
among the crews for whom there were few if any
relief personnel. 53
37
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A welcome reinforcement was the longpromised US Navy seaplane unit, which began
to arrive at the end of August. The 250 American
personnel from the US Naval Reserve Flying
Corps under the command of Lieutenant Robert
Donahue of the US Coast Guard established a
temporary base at Indian Beach at North Sydney,
where they immediately ran up the stars and
stripes. The officers were quartered in town while
the men were housed in tents provided by the
Canadian army. The gale on 7 September that
had caused the submarine chasers such a
terrifying night in the Cabot Strait, flattened the
tents and damaged the first of the Curtiss HS2L
seaplanes that the airmen were then assembling.
This setback was quickly overcome, and one
machine began test flights on the 11th, causing
a local sensation. 54 "Many people," according to
the Post, "are suffering from sore necks" after
rushing about and straining to keep the aircraft
in view.55
The first operational flights took place on
22 September when two machines each flew for
about two and a half hours, covering HS 56 as it
sailed. By early October, when a total of four
aircraft were operational and two more had been
delivered, coverage was possible on the full scale
that had been planned. As HS 58 formed up and
sailed on the 8th, three aircraft flew a total of
five missions that provided constant air cover
from 1000 hours until 1730 hours when the
convoy was about 60 miles out to sea. One of
the aircraft suffered engine trouble that forced
it to put down offshore but, despite the heavy
swell, trawlers of the Canadian flotilla soon
rescued the airmen and towed in the aircraft
before it had suffered any serious damage.
Convoy coverage continued on the scale given to
HS 58 during the rest of October.
The camp at Indian Beach was only a stopgap
while work was carried out on the permanent
site at nearby Kelly's Beach, where the water
approaches had to be dredged and the ground
needed filling and levelling. Construction of the
buildings, three three-storey units, had to be
quick and of top quality because the US Navy
had made the early provision of "permanent"
accommodation for its men a precondition for
the dispatch of the air units to a northern climate
so late in the season. Indeed, the US Navy
Department insisted upon the use of its standard
designs, which featured full concrete basements

and steam heating plants. The beginning of this
work was delayed until September because the
D e p a r t m e n t of Public Works, which was
responsible for the project, hesitated to award
such expensive contracts when tarpaper huts set
on sills on the ground and heated by coal stoves
were considered a d e q u a t e for C a n a d i a n
personnel. 56 Once started, progress was rapid
even though, as one weekly report put it, "the
very bad weather has turned the site into a
quagmire." 57 By late October, one of the two
planned hundred-man barracks and a large
stores building were nearly complete and the
basements of a mess hall and the second
barracks were finished.58 The performance of
both the American aviation personnel and the
Canadian building contractor's crews were all
the more impressive in view of the fact that an
influenza epidemic hit the camp in late
September, causing at least two deaths among
the Americans.59 The Canadian navy department
immediately rented several houses in town to
enable the American personnel to move out of
the unhealthy tents and sheds at Indian Beach.60
The large and costly undertaking at North Sydney
and the similar development at Baker Point,
Dartmouth — the origin of the present Canadian
Forces air station Shearwater — were intended
to lay the foundations for a still greater effort in
1919 when it seemed certain the U-boats would
return in greater numbers and operate more
aggressively. Additional air defences planned
included both self-propelled dirigible and escorttowed o b s e r v a t i o n b a l l o o n s , a n d t h e
establishment of sub-stations Cape Sable,
Canso, Cape North or the Magdalen Islands, and
in the vicinity of the Strait of Belle Isle. The Royal
Canadian Naval Air Service, which had begun to
organize in the fall of the 1918, would ultimately
take over these operations, using the equipment
supplied by the Americans. 61
Similarly, the Canadian navy regarded the
hastily assembled organization at Sydney as
merely a beginning and not a very satisfactory
one. An exhausted, frustrated Hose made it clear
that his fleet, its supporting facilities, and the
haphazard manner of providing and training
personnel would all have to be completely
overhauled. Most importantly, better warships
were essential, and during the fall of 1918 senior
officers and the Canadian government pressed
the British and Americans hard for the provision
of destroyer type escorts in 1919.62 Fortunately,
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U-156's i n s h o r e o p e r a t i o n s a n d t h e l e s s
destructive cruise offshore by U-l17 in August
proved to be the worst t h a t w a s coming in 1918.
A l t h o u g h U-l55 a r r i v e d i n t h e H a l i f a x
approaches in mid-September, it lay low, unable
to find m u c h shipping. Two small minefields
planted by the s u b m a r i n e did no damage before
the C a n a d i a n forces discovered them. Ignoring
orders to p u s h further into the C a n a d i a n area,
the b o a t h a d t h e n moved to the US coast. The
two s u b m a r i n e s following U-l55 did not in fact
p r e s s on beyond the central Atlantic. 6 3
Victory celebrations got u n d e r way early in
S y d n e y . A p r e m a t u r e a n n o u n c e m e n t on 7
November that "the H u n h a d finally crawled into
h i s hole," 6 4 a n d a n o t h e r on the 10 t h c a u s e d
s p o n t a n e o u s festivities in the streets. The actual
news of the armistice on the morning of the 11 t h
s e e m e d s o m e w h a t anti-climatic. 6 5 Organized
events on the 12 th fully restored the festive mood.
The crews of the US s u b m a r i n e c h a s e r s gave a
d a n c e at a hall in downtown Sydney "that will
long be remembered by those who were fortunate
enough to attend it," b e c a u s e of the exposure to
the latest t r e n d s in p o p u l a r m u s i c s o u t h of the
border. Among the e n t e r t a i n e r s w a s s e a m a n
J o n e s who "sang the American "Rag" songs in
an inimitable m a n n e r a n d w a s compelled to
r e s p o n d to each solo several times. It was a new
thing to most of the people there a n d they enjoyed
it immensely." The dance m u s i c w a s provided
by a jazz b a n d and, in the words of the Post,
"they certainly did p u t some "pep" into it." 66
At North Sydney the victory celebrations got
a little o u t of h a n d . Following Thanksgiving
services at several of the c h u r c h e s , followed by
a p a r a d e of the school children "in which the
firemen a n d a n u m b e r of American naval m e n
a n d aviators took part," the festivities concluded
in the evening with a large bonfire at the ballast
g r o u n d where t h e kaiser w a s b u r n e d in effigy.
During the evening, unfortunately, there were
"several clashes between r e t u r n e d soldiers a n d
American sailors" on Commercial Street,
apparently the only serious incidents of violence.
Several arrests were made of disturbers on both
sides of the argument, and the climax was
reached about eleven o'clock when some person
set fire to a mattress in the jail, which
necessitated the calling out of the firemen. Little
damage was done by the fire, but one soldier
was nearly overcome by the smoke.67

A thrilling, if brief, epoch in the city's history
symbolically came to an e n d on 25 November
w h e n the officers a n d m e n of t h e naval b a s e
h o s t e d a farewell d a n c e at Sydney's hockey
arena. More t h a n 1,100 g u e s t s , "everybody a n d
his wife a n d a lot of others with other peoples'
wives," as the Post p u t it, were in a t t e n d a n c e .
Special t r a m cars were r u n to Whitney Pier at
1:30 am to take h o m e g u e s t s from t h a t area,
while a special ferry operated from North Sydney
for the occasion.
There were men in uniforms of all descriptions
and ranks of the army and navy, American and
Canadian alike allied themselves for the evening's
fun and all thought of the war was forgotten.
People who had not danced for years forgot that
they were too old to dance and after sitting out
for a time they were seen to move gingerly, at
first, about the floor, and then they danced with
all their old time vim.
The arena was transformed for the occasion into
"a fairyland" with s t r e a m e r s of coloured lights,
flags a n d bunting. At the rear w a s a h u g e u n i o n
j a c k a n d across the centre was Nelson's famous
signal, "England expects everyone to do his duty,"
a n d as the Post said, "everybody did...The affair
will long be r e m e m b e r e d as one of t h e m o s t
enjoyable ever in the city." At the close of the
evening,
three cheers were given for Mr Menzies and the
bandsmen and the members of the Jazz Band
orchestra, who gave their services free for the
evening. After these one of the navy men called
for cheers for Sydney and these were given with
a heartiness which left little doubt as to the warm
feeling that Sydney holds in the hearts of the men
of the navy of both services. On the other hand
they have made friends and they have most of
them won the respect and liking of the people of
the city.68
On the following morning, C a p t a i n J a m e s
Turnbull, the acting port convoy officer, officially
closed the Sydney convoy office, t h o u g h not
before formally t h a n k i n g the h a r b o u r ' s pilots for
"the s m a r t way in which they have cooperated
with me in the sailing of the convoys." 6 9 T h a t
same day the naval patrol organization at Sydney
received instructions to discontinue operations
a n d p r o c e e d to Halifax. 7 0 T h e h u n d r e d s of
servicemen from Canada, Britain a n d the United
States would very quickly be gone a n d the naval
b a s e a n d h a r b o u r fortifications would be
dismantled, presumably never to be resurrected
39
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if this had indeed been the war to end war. Twenty
years later, of course, Sydney would again be
invaded by even greater numbers of soldiers,
airmen, and seamen from Canada, Britain and
the United States and other nations as well. They
would stay much longer — six years. The
American and British presence would be
transient, however, as the Canadian forces
controlled and provided most of what was
needed for Sydney's much greater part in the
Second World War.
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